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ABSTRACT 
  The ongoing debate about the legal duty to rescue another person 
in peril is fraught with a familiar tension. On one side stands the 
traditional and distinctly American determination that freedom from 
such a duty is essential, that the technical rules of tort law and self-
preservation instincts disdain such a requirement, and that the 
postulates of religion and morality are sure to fill in any legal gaps. 
On the other, a more recent humanitarian perspective—seen in 
revisions to the Restatement, case law, and some state statutes—
advocates for requiring easy rescue, positing that religiously inspired 
morality and public good-doing are unlikely, and citing highly 
publicized incidents in which bystanders remained callously, though 
lawfully, inactive. 
  But the classic dialogue between an autonomist’s protection of the 
rescuer and the humanitarian protection of the rescuee has thus far 
neglected a thorough treatment of a figure viscerally affected by the 
slow erosion of the historical no-duty rule: the hero. The hero derives 
his meaning by acting in ways that are not legally required; in other 
words, the hero is valuable because he acts not as the law’s 
“reasonable man,” but as a figure wholly outside of it. This Note 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Amelia H. Ashton. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2010; Stanford University, B.A. 2005. 
Thank you to Professor Doriane Coleman for her mentorship of both this piece and of me, to 
Kyle Thomason for his insightful edits, to Natalie Bedoya for her lessons in writing and in 
leadership, and to my fellow Journal members, who make me proud to be a part of this 
publication. Thank you most of all to my parents—the very first academic writers I knew—who 
instilled in me a love of language and ideas, and who have always supported and believed in me. 
ASHTON IN FINAL FINAL.DOC 9/15/2009  6:21:32 PM 
70 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:69 
argues that as the duty to rescue expands, the moral realm in which 
the hero acts consequently shrinks, and that the values a hero inspires 
in society—hope, exemplary conduct, public celebration, societal 
reflection, and spiritual absolution—are likely to suffer as well.  In 
this way, increasing the duty to rescue not only affects society but also 
runs the risk of confusing the law by deeming potentially heroic 
action reasonable. This dual distortion of social and legal values 
merits a new and invigorated examination of the role of the hero as a 
real and meaningful concept—a concept that risks danger should the 
duty to rescue continue to expand. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the law as a line that separates legal requirement from 
moral choice on a continuum that embodies all acts of rescue. The 
first space on the continuum is a realm of “legal duty,” wherein 
certain behavior is required by law. The second space, residing on the 
other side of the line, is a realm of “no legal duty,” wherein acts are 
evaluated according to moral norms and social aspirations. This 
second space is also the realm of a little-discussed figure in American 
duty to rescue law: the hero.1 If heroes are heroes because of their 
decisions to act in ways that set them apart, then a society that 
demands action through law redefines the notion of who is a hero 
and, correspondingly, the nature of heroic acts. Because the law 
typically provides that ordinary actions—what the average person 
does or would do—are the essence of reasonableness, the legal 
boundary simultaneously defines the reasonable person. Necessarily, 
the creation of new legal duties to rescue increases the size of the 
 
 1. Several articles have considered the repercussions to altruism or heroes and then 
quickly discarded the notion. See John M. Adler, Relying upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: 
Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or 
Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 918 (recognizing and briefly refuting “the 
argument . . . that where altruism is required, it loses its moral value to society”); Marin Roger 
Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1469, 1474 (2008) (noting that a duty to rescue would create a “discount of 
altruism,” which would mean that “altruistic, praiseworthy behavior will be transformed and 
diminished to not much more than ordinary obedience of the law and compliance with the 
minimum social expectation that is articulated by that law” as one in a list of “costs of a coercive 
rule”); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
423, 434 (1985) (“A final concern is that a rescue duty would deprive society of clear examples 
of heroic conduct by making it uncertain whether rescue had been occasioned by altruistic 
impulses or by fear of legal sanctions. However, any rescue law would almost certainly 
provide . . . that a would-be rescuer need not imperil his own life. As such, there would be ample 
opportunity for heroism.”). 
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legal space on the continuum and thus decreases what remains—the 
moral space—by leaving citizens a moral choice to take action in 
fewer instances.2 As a result, shifting the location of the line of the law 
along the continuum of rescue acts either increases or decreases the 
number of instances in which individual actions can be characterized 
as heroic or merely as the right thing to do, as required by the law. 
Anglo-American law proscribes an extremely narrow set of legal 
duties, leaving a large moral realm in which a citizen may choose to 
act heroically or simply to be an uninvolved bystander.3 This holds 
true for a broad range of scenarios. On one end of the spectrum of 
rescue acts exist cases of “easy rescue,”4 in which an onlooker could 
act without incurring harm to himself or others, such as by picking up 
a baby in the path of an oncoming train.5 On the other end, situations 
of more difficult or “expensive” rescue arise, with risks that could cost 
the would-be rescuers loss of property or tangible opportunity, 
infliction of serious bodily injury, and even their lives.6 The decision 
to construct the space of legally required rescue so narrowly has been 
the subject of much debate in both the legal academic literature7 and 
in policy circles.8 This decision has historically been defended on two 
main grounds: that legally required rescue infringes upon a distinctly 
American sense of individual liberty, and that it flies in the face of 
 
 2. See A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 1273, 1273 (1983) (“The area of so-called Good Samaritan law . . . is one in which the 
relationship between morality and law is particularly sensitive.”). 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 750 
(1994) (suggesting that hypothetically “courts might recognize a limited duty to rescue that 
would be enforceable only in tort law, and that would apply only to cases of ‘easy rescue,’ in 
which one individual is able to rescue another with little or no risk or expense to herself or 
others”). 
 5. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 6. See Heyman, supra note 4, at 750 (“[E]asy rescues involve no significant risk of injury 
or expenditure of resources that would require public compensation to the rescuer or others.”). 
 7. E.g., Silver, supra note 1, at 423; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 
YALE L.J. 247, 258–68 (1980); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to 
Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 13–23 (1993). 
 8. This debate has led several states to enact statutes establishing an affirmative duty to 
rescue or otherwise aid. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002) (establishing a duty to 
report certain heinous crimes); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008) (establishing a duty to 
provide “reasonable assistance”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (2002) (establishing an 
affirmative duty to report a rape that occurred in one’s presence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 
(2002) (establishing a duty to provide “reasonable assistance”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 
2005) (establishing a duty to aid); see also Silver, supra note 1, at 427 (describing legislative 
enactments of duties to aid in various states); infra Part II. 
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natural law instincts of self-preservation.9 The law generally cherishes 
the choice not to rescue, even in the least risky of cases. The result is 
a moral sphere left wide open to the possibility of heroes. 
Relatively recently, however, the law has been characterized by 
small but steady attempts to shrink that sphere by increasing legal 
duties to rescue.10 The movement has been justified by humanitarian 
concerns and a utilitarian perspective that champions the important 
and palpable benefit of saving a life in easy rescue cases—that is, 
cases containing no tangible risk to the would-be rescuer and, it is 
argued, a comparably insignificant loss of personal liberty.11 States 
have steadily chipped away at the no-duty realm through case law12 
and Good Samaritan statutes,13 which legally require action in these 
scenarios. The shift reflects an increasingly strong norm that rescue 
acts that would have little risk14 should be required by law. 
Even given this trend, evidence of an ongoing debate about the 
duty to rescue remains. Legislatures have required further duties only 
incrementally,15 and Good Samaritan statutes have rarely, if ever, 
been enforced.16 Despite the academic17 and sometimes even societal18 
call for reform, the common law tradition of narrow duties seems to 
 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. See supra note 8; infra Part II. 
 11. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 7, at 272 (“It . . . seems that the imposition of a duty to 
effect an easy rescue in an emergency would form a coherent part of a growing pattern in those 
doctrines that most fully embody the common law’s notion of individual liberty.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral 
Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 
252, 291 (1983) (“A person should accept the principle of easy rescue because it enhances his 
liberty.”). 
 12. The Restatement codified these trends by identifying four circumstances in which a 
duty to rescue was owed: the duties of a common carrier to its passengers, an innkeeper to his 
guests, a possessor of land who holds it open to the public to the visiting public, and one who 
voluntarily undertakes custody of another to the one in custody. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314A(1)–(4) (1965). Though these situations may not always be classified as easy 
rescue, it is likely that on balance the requirement that the rescue act need only be 
“reasonable,” id. § 314A(1), ensures this. For a discussion of some of the case law that tends 
toward expanding the duty, see infra Part II. 
 13. See infra notes 97–113. 
 14. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. E.g., Nancy Benac, Pretty Good Samaritans: Unlike European Countries, the United 
States Has Generally Chosen Not to Adopt Laws Requiring Residents to Help Someone in Need, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 2C (“It was a rare case of prosecution in America 
for failing to help someone in need.”). 
 17. See supra note 7. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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maintain an impressive stronghold.19 The discussion that continues is 
broad—each side takes its own stance on the realistic likelihood of 
successfully defining legal causation,20 respecting individual liberty,21 
overcoming the practical difficulties of enforcement,22 and wrestling 
with the special relationship and affirmative act exceptions to the 
duty to rescue should it expand.23 
The academic and policy discussion of the no-duty-to-rescue 
rule, however, has thus far excluded a thorough analysis of an 
external cost to requiring rescue that may tip the debate: decreasing 
the possibility of heroes.24 Heroic acts are valuable from a social 
standpoint because they provide an ideal to which citizens can aspire, 
inspire hope, serve as a means of spiritual absolution, and benefit 
people who are rescued. They are also valuable from a legal 
standpoint because they provide a foil for the acts of the reasonable 
man, steadying the law by offering an example of what it should not 
require.25 Looking critically at the effect upon heroes of expanding 
the duty to rescue is about the autonomous self in that it advocates a 
society in which strongly defined heroes are advantageous to 
individuals. This critical analysis is also about utility in that heroes 
create a host of social benefits. But arguing for a greater 
consideration of heroes does not precisely conform to the enduring 
tensions between the autonomist common law and the modern 
utilitarian trend. Rather, it exists, more than not, outside that debate, 
campaigning for a figure that is crucial to society and the law. 
The wide range of views on what constitutes heroism,26 however, 
makes the concept difficult to define. A recluse who highly cherishes 
autonomy may view an easy rescue, such as picking up a baby from 
the railroad tracks, as expensive because it forces him to give up his 
freedom not to act. At the other end of the moral spectrum, another 
may unflinchingly sacrifice his own life to save another. 
For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is oddly both 
important to define the term as clearly as possible while 
simultaneously remembering that this is hugely difficult, if not 
 
 19. See infra notes 97–126 and accompanying text. 
 20. Adler, supra note 1, at 912–13. 
 21. Id. at 914. 
 22. Id. at 919. 
 23. Id. at 886, 888. 
 24. See supra note 1. 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
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impossible, to accomplish. In the former vein, the definition of “hero” 
in this Note reflects the context of physical rescue in a particular 
instant, and thus encapsulates one who stands to lose something 
important by attempting to rescue another—one who risks serious 
injury (mental or physical) or financial loss through an act. With 
regard to the latter point, however, it is crucial that the term retain 
some ambiguity. Because what constitutes “something important” 
varies according to the would-be rescuer, the movement of the legal 
line remains important regardless of what precisely the law may ever 
require. In order to have repercussions, the law need not necessarily 
require an extreme measure; instead, it may require only gradations 
of heroic acts and, in doing so, still have pointed effects. It is the very 
personal meaning of the word “hero”—like the meaning of the word 
“reasonable”—that makes its care essential. Like the ongoing debate 
about the reasonable man, the debate about the hero should focus on 
the ongoing evolution of the creature, rather than on one particular 
perspective on his nature. 
When states pass duty-to-rescue statutes, they necessarily impose 
their own legal definition of heroism by declaring that a certain 
course of action is not heroic, but legally required. Making the hero a 
reasonable man infringes upon a complex social construct that by its 
nature is anything but reasonable. Even when expanded duties go 
unenforced, such legislation tinkers with the understanding of the 
hero, distorting and ultimately decreasing its meaning. This 
consideration is particularly crucial at present, when the vast majority 
of states have not yet created an affirmative duty to rescue27 and 
experience suggests that such legislation often reacts to horrific 
failures to rescue, and is therefore likely produced with more haste 
than thought.28 
Amidst the debate between autonomists and utilitarians,29 this 
Note argues that the significance of heroes is another, separate factor 
that ought to be considered by those who would shift the line of the 
law to gradually erode the no-duty rule, and in so doing, narrow the 
realm of potential heroic acts. The Note proceeds as follows: Part I 
reviews the historical common law prohibition against requiring any 
duty whatsoever. Part II examines the slow erosion of the common 
law no-duty rule, including the evolution of the Restatement and 
 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
 29. See supra notes 15–23 and accompanying text. 
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Good Samaritan laws, and discusses the theoretical and philosophical 
views motivating the movement. Finally, Part III departs from 
conventional legal wisdom by investigating the implications not for 
the liberty of a would-be rescuer or the safety of a potential rescuee, 
but for heroes in a society that legally compels rescue. It investigates 
the definition of heroes and heroic acts and explains their 
significance, ultimately arguing that increasing legal duties affects 
heroes in ways that merit a new and focused attention. 
I.  THE NO-DUTY RULE AT COMMON LAW 
Historically, Anglo-American common law required no duty to 
rescue, even if the rescue would be easy or inexpensive, costing the 
would-be rescuer nothing but time or loss of autonomy.30 The rule 
made for case law rich in disturbing examples, in which callous 
bystanders simply watched as easily savable victims suffered before 
them. The case of Buch v. Armory Manufacturing Co.,31 for instance, 
has been memorialized for its depiction of a particularly gruesome 
hypothetical scene in which a bystander sees a young child on the 
railroad tracks. 
He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself, and the 
instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, 
perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but 
he is not liable in damages for the child’s injury, or indictable under 
the statute for its death.32 
 
 30. Charles O. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in 
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 23, 23–24 (James M. Ratcliff ed., 1966) (“Our common 
law has always refused to transmute moral duties into legal duties. . . . [I]t is clear at common 
law that nobody has to lift a finger—let alone spend a dime and dial a phone number or actually 
render aid—to help a stranger in peril or distress.” (citations omitted)). 
 31. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1899). The case itself was not exactly about 
the duty to rescue, rather about whether a young boy—whose hand was injured when it became 
stuck in the gears of a machine at a mill—could recover, despite the fact that he was trespassing 
upon the property. Id. at 810. Chief Justice Carpenter seems to have created the hypothetical 
about the baby on the railroad tracks to justify his admittedly harsh decision not to allow for 
recovery. See id. (observing that in cases involving small children, courts have sometimes 
inappropriately blurred moral sentiment and the law). 
 32. Id. The passage has been the inspiration for the titles of several law review articles. See, 
e.g., Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and Patriot Acts: Rights and Duties in the Worst of 
Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 242 (2006); Lipkin, supra note 11. 
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The real—rather than hypothetical—cases have been no less 
dramatic or shocking.33 
Despite the potential for disturbing outcomes, the no-duty rule 
was essentially justified by three arguments. First, a legal requirement 
to rescue would invade autonomy, which is closely related to two 
other propositions: the consent-of-the-governed rationale and the 
harm principle. Second, creating a duty would run counter to natural 
law principles. Finally, religious sensibility was expected to fill any 
potential gap left by legally requiring so little action. 
Of these, the autonomy discussion has been most prevalent. The 
distinctly American sensibility of autonomy—noted as early as the 
country’s inception by Alexis de Tocqueville34—is strongly credited 
with the formulation of and adherence to this rule, which upholds the 
freedom to decide whether or not to rescue at the expense of injury to 
a victim.35 And despite notorious descriptions of pitiless bystanders 
who simply look on as victims perish, there is some sense that 
discomfort with imposing a duty to rescue reflects a genuine and 
warranted concern about liberty.36 Viewing the requirement of action 
as an infringement assumes that one values what is being infringed 
upon: control over one’s own decisions is fundamental from the 
autonomist’s perspective.37 For some, these are high stakes, and 
 
 33. In Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959), for example, the defendant taunted the 
plaintiff, ultimately convincing him to jump into a trench that was at least eight feet deep. Id. at 
343. He drowned. In considering whether Yania’s estate could recover for Bigan’s failure to 
rescue him, the court dismissed the argument that Bigan had placed Yania in his position of 
peril. Id. at 345. Instead, Yania was responsible for his own actions, and Bigan was consequently 
under no legal obligation to rescue him. Id. at 346. 
 34. G.W. PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE IN AMERICA 161 (1938) (“It’s really an incredible thing, 
I assure you, to see how this people keeps itself in order through the single conviction that its 
only safeguard against itself lies in itself.”). Another bedrock of American identity, Patrick 
Henry’s oft-quoted quip, “Give me liberty or give me death,” has been taken as shorthand for 
the notion that “liberty . . . is more valuable than security.” Alan Calnan, Strict Liability and the 
Liberal-Justice Theory of Torts, 38 N.M. L. REV. 95, 103 n.33 (2008). 
 35. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 
373 (5th ed. 1984) (noting the “highly individualistic philosophy of the older common law”). 
 36. See George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1443, 1451 (1994) (discussing “the problem with affirmative duties”). 
 37. See id. (“All of a sudden you find yourself next to the pond with the proverbial 
drowning child. You must act now. It matters not that you are not in the mood to be a hero or 
that you have something better to do. There is nothing quite so unpredictable and insistent as 
having the circumstances determine when and how we must act.”). 
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requiring action is seen as an offense to liberty so grave that it 
equates to “[making] man a slave.”38 
The autonomy argument is linked to the consent-of-the-
governed rationale, which holds that citizens legitimize their 
government by consenting to it because it reflects their autonomous 
choices.39 A lack of freedom of choice in the law, then, is an affront 
both to individual liberty and individuals who would sustain a 
legitimate government. 
The importance of individual liberty is also linked to the harm 
principle—the notion that a legal wrong is constituted only when a 
harm is inflicted.40 The common law’s commitment to punishing 
misfeasance (essentially, a bad act)41 but ignoring nonfeasance 
(essentially, a non act)42 further supported a system that refrained 
from prosecuting the absence of rescue.43 This development grew 
naturally from a “highly individualistic philosophy of the older 
common law [which] had no great difficulty in working out restraints 
upon the commission of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank from 
converting the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one 
another.”44 The distinction between omissions and acts is more 
formally justified by noting that the former results in no change to the 
victims’ situations—at most a missed opportunity to benefit them—
 
 38. Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. 
REV. 196, 214 (1946). 
 39. Lipkin, supra note 11, at 277. 
 40. Id. at 279; see also id. at 279 & n.158 (arguing that autonomous individuals would likely 
endorse the harm principle, which prohibits injurious interference with another’s person, 
property, or interests). The principle reinforces the notion of the individual as beyond the reach 
of a government seeking to impose a duty to aid rule. Id. at 282 n.179. 
 41. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 373 (“There arose very early a difference, 
still deeply rooted in the law of negligence, between ‘misfeasance’ and ‘nonfeasance’—that is to 
say, between active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction or a 
failure to take steps to protect them from harm.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 7, at 251–58 (discussing the lack of a duty to rescue and its 
roots in the common-law distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance). The actual 
difference between the two categories, however, has raised much discussion. See, e.g., id. at 249 
(describing how the development of the Coase theorem may make the distinction insignificant). 
 44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 373. 
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whereas the latter inflicts positive harm.45 The rules of causation, 
linked to the requirement of an act, only compounded this dilemma.46 
In addition to the forces of social identity and legal structure that 
supported an autonomist perspective, the no-duty rule paralleled the 
psychological underpinnings of early common law, which recognized 
that the desire to rescue—because of its risks—ran counter to the 
“natural law” principle of self-preservation.47 The instinct for survival 
was so fundamental and ingrained that it could not realistically be 
expected to subside in times of potentially life-threatening acts of 
rescue. 
Finally, it was also assumed that the strength of moral aspirations 
and social norms would compensate for the lack of a formal legal 
duty. Specifically, the existence and understanding of the divide on 
the legal and moral continuum under common law doctrine was 
justified by the promise of religion, a moral sphere expected to pick 
up where the common law’s harsh disregard for the would-be rescuee 
left off.48 Because religions generally promote altruism and self-
 
 45. Weinrib, supra note 7, at 251; see also Terry v. Lincscott Hotel Corp., 617 P.2d 56, 61 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that allegations regarding an omission or nonfeasance did not 
constitute a cause of action). 
 46. See Lipkin, supra note 11, at 267 (“Since liability depends on actually doing something 
which results in injury, so-called ‘negative causation’ has no place in tort law. . . . ‘[N]egative 
causation’ opens a Pandora’s box of insuperable difficulties.”). 
 47. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as 
a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1774 (2008) (“[Edward] Coke[, a common 
law jurist whose philosophies influenced the Bill of Rights,] agreed with the proposition that 
basic principles of justice were built into the natural order itself, asserting that the ‘law of nature 
is part of the law of England.’ Moreover, Coke agreed that the fundamental basis of law is 
reason rather than will, and that therefore laws that violate basic principles of justice may not 
properly be called ‘law’ at all . . . .” (quoting Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 391 (K.B.) 
(Coke, C.J.)) (citing 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1608), as 
reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE § 69, at 684 
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003))); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 623 (1958) (“Natural-law theory . . . in all its protean guises, attempts 
to . . . assert that human beings are equally devoted to and united in their conception of aims 
(the pursuit of knowledge, justice to their fellow men) other than that of survival . . . .”). This 
line of reasoning continues to serve as a justification for at least some form of no-duty rule even 
today. See RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 191 (1987) (noting 
that self-sacrifice “represents an evolutionary mistake”); Michael S. Moore, Reply, More on Act 
and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1799 (1994) (“The instinct for survival or the fear of loss of 
one’s own life or bodily integrity may be such that we find it understandable that one could not 
be a moral hero. Running from a bear as fast as one can is surely one such example.”). 
 48. See Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 710, 738–40 (2007) (discussing the idea that Christianity works to elevate society by 
encouraging the practice of heroism); Lisa McCabe, Comment, Police Officers’ Duty to Rescue 
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sacrifice,49 they would encourage rescue behavior even without the 
creation of a legal duty. 
In In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co.,50 for example, a majority 
opinion explicitly cited reward in the afterlife as a kind of damages 
for a group of rescuers who saved lives from a sinking ship and 
subsequently sought compensation from the pool of money awarded 
the towing company. In denying their claim, the court noted: “What 
they did was inspired by the spirit which since Christendom has been 
the foundation of the great brotherhood of mankind. . . . Their reward 
they have; it never can be taken from them, and it is measured by a 
standard greater than money.”51 
Jesus Christ responds similarly to the question arguably at the 
heart of the intersection of religion and tort law—“Who is my 
neighbour?”52—with a parable that seems designed to teach the moral 
duty to aid rule. In it, a Samaritan who “show[s] mercy” to a man 
beaten and left for dead by robbers is deemed to have “proved [his] 
neighbor,” and Jesus encourages his followers to “‘[g]o, and do thou 
likewise.’”53 These and other moments in the New Testament54 reveal 
a sort of superhuman standard55 that stands in stark contrast to the 
 
or Aid: Are They Only Good Samaritans?, 72 CAL. L. REV. 661, 678 (1984) (“[A]cts that aspire 
toward human perfection . . . are better left with an individual’s inner morality . . . .”). 
 49. See JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN 156 (2000) 
(“[R]eligions nearly always promise that self-sacrifice now will reap enormous rewards later.”). 
 50. In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co. (The Eastland), 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919). 
 51. Id. at 540. 
 52. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.). 
See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 53, at 358–59 (discussing the evolution of the 
concept of one’s “neighbor” in tort law). 
 53. Luke 10:25–37 (American Standard). The moment is also referenced in Buch v. Amory 
Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898). See supra note 31. 
 54. See, e.g., John 15:13 (American Standard) (“Greater love has no man than this, that a 
man lay down his life for his friends.”). The same quote is embossed on each Carnegie Hero 
Foundation medal given posthumously. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, http://www. 
carnegiehero.org/fund_history.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2009); see also infra notes 138–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 55. Jesus’s approach seems attributable to his extremely sensitized empathy, or rachamin. 
See DONALD MCNEIL ET AL., COMPASSION: A REFLECTION ON THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 16–17 
(1983) (“He became lost with the lost, hungry with the hungry, and sick with the sick.”). 
Similarly, many contemporary heroes credit their faith with their ability to engage in 
superhuman efforts despite severe illness. See, e.g., MARIA TARNAWSKA, SISTER FAUSTINA 
KOWALSKA: HER LIFE AND MISSION 318–19 (Anne Hargest-Gorzelak trans., 1989) (“Although 
loneliness and darkness and sufferings of all kinds beat against my heart, the mysterious power 
of God supports and strengthens me.”). 
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inaction permitted by the law, even surpassing a moral stance that 
would advocate for the requirement of an easy rescue.56 
By comparison, legal scholars have remarked upon the stark 
contrast between law and religion on this point.57 In Donoghue v. 
Stevenson,58 Lord Atkin made an early attempt at describing the tort 
concept of duty by referring to the same Biblical scene, noting, “The 
rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must 
not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my 
neighbour? receives a restricted reply.”59 To the extent that law 
conforms itself to the expectations of the reasonable man,60 religious 
views on the duty to aid are of a different world. 
In sum, the strong stance against a duty to rescue taken in 
common law jurisprudence was buttressed by a long list of essential 
philosophical and legal concepts that a creation of the duty would 
have upset: individual autonomy, consent theory, the harm principle, 
and natural law. The position was further strengthened by the 
enduring understanding that religion had the capacity to pick up 
where the law left off, requiring and rewarding moral acts even if the 
courts did not obligate them. 
II.  THE SLOW EROSION OF THE NO-DUTY RULE 
If early common law was the domain of autonomists, then the 
recent evolution of the law has been led by utilitarians. The utilitarian 
view privileges the benefits of easy rescue over the loss of autonomy 
that the common law traditionally upheld.61 The view is buoyed by 
 
 56. For this stance, see Lipkin, supra note 11, at 293. “[N]umerous emergencies arise when 
rescues can be effected safely and easily by observers who have no special relation to the victim. 
Requiring easy rescue will save lives and reduce injury at virtually no cost.” Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Sungeeta Jain, How Many People Does It Take to Save a Drowning Baby?: A 
Good Samaritan Statute in Washington State, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1181–82 (1999) 
(recounting the Biblical story of the Good Samaritan before noting that “[m]ost American 
states . . . do not have Good Samaritan laws,” but “[i]nstead . . . follow the common law ‘no duty 
to rescue’ rule that states that bystanders have no duty to come to the aid of those in peril”). 
 58. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.). 
 59. Id. at 580. 
 60. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 32, at 173 (discussing the reasonable person and 
noting that “[t]he whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of 
behavior”). 
 61. Michael A. Santoro, Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles 
Justifying Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
923, 936–37 (2006) (“A [utilitarian] premise of the duty of rescue is that the cost to the rescuer 
or others must not be so great as to (in the extreme case) outweigh the benefit to the person 
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humanitarian concerns62 that have motivated a gradual erosion of the 
no-duty rule. 
There are several reasons behind the slow but steady 
promulgation of the duty to rescue. First, there is the sense that, in 
general, “[c]hanging social conditions lead constantly to the 
recognition of new duties.”63 More specifically, there is the sense that 
the expansion of the duty to rescue has been necessitated by religion’s 
decreasing ability to hold fast society’s moral sensibilities.64 This view 
makes the movement a reaction to a contemporary reality the 
common law did not foresee, and insists that social norms can no 
longer be trusted to encourage moral action when the law does not 
require it. In addition to a general malaise about the likelihood of 
public good-doing, the movement can also be attributed to specific 
piecemeal changes via case law, in which courts consistently found 
exception to the harshness of the no-duty rule.65 Further, legislative 
responses to horrific and widely publicized stories of desensitized 
onlookers who refused to act also altered the legal landscape of the 
rule.66 And finally, there has been a steadily rising call in legal 
literature for a duty in easy rescue cases.67 To date, the movement has 
seen concrete progress in at least three ways: a Restatement section 
formally imposing a duty to rescue in four specific scenarios, the 
development of a body of cases addressing that section, and statutory 
 
being rescued. The less burdensome it is for the rescuer and the greater the benefit to the 
person being rescued, the more compelling is the obligation to act.” (citation omitted)). 
 62. This Note characterizes this shift as “humanitarian,” using the word’s more colloquial 
meaning without exploring its full philosophical connotations. Other authors discuss more 
thoroughly the movement’s humanitarian origins. See Julie Stone Peters, “Literature,” the 
“Rights of Man,” and Narratives of Atrocity: Historical Backgrounds to the Culture of Testimony, 
17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 253, 261 (2005) (“Rights and the humanitarian duty to aid were, in a 
sense, two sides of the very definition of what it was to be human: One had rights by virtue of 
one’s humanity . . . and it was one’s sense of obligation to another’s suffering that proved one 
human . . . .”); Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really 
Leave a Victim Lying in the Street? What is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive 
Unabated?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 362 n.104 (1999) (discussing the “acknowledged tendency of 
courts to expand the category of special relationships based on humanitarian concerns”). 
 63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 53, at 359. 
 64. See id. § 56, at 375 (“The remedy in [duty to aid cases] is left to the ‘higher law’ and the 
‘voice of conscience,’ which, in a wicked world, would seem to be singularly ineffective either to 
prevent the harm or to compensate the victim.” (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 
281, 282 (Kan. 1903))). 
 65. See infra notes 88–96. 
 66. See infra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra note 4. 
ASHTON IN FINAL FINAL.DOC 9/15/2009  6:21:32 PM 
82 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:69 
rules propagated by individual states, also known as Good Samaritan 
laws. 
First, Section 314A of the Second Restatement and its caveat and 
comment68 codified a gradual shift in case law that recognized a duty 
to rescue in certain circumstances.69 At first, a sort of contractual duty 
to aid resulted in cases in which people held themselves out as 
performers of a public service and then breached their duty in that 
performance.70 From there, the case law began to recognize a duty to 
aid between two parties whose relationship maintained certain 
characteristics that made that duty reasonable. In short, legal duties 
to rescue have been applied in the presence of a mismatched 
relationship, in which the plaintiff is relatively dependent upon the 
defendant or at an economic disadvantage.71 
The four formal categories of exceptions to the no-duty rule as 
described in the Second Restatement § 314A (the duties of a common 
carrier to its passengers, an innkeeper to his guests, a “possessor of 
land who holds it open to the public” to the visiting public, and one 
who voluntarily undertakes custody of another to the one in 
custody)72 are variations on the patterns recognized by case law.73 
More precisely, the Restatement relationships derive from scenarios 
in which the would-be rescuer limits the victim’s options for rescue by 
choosing to invite him into a closed sphere—his own carrier, inn, 
land, or care.74 
The caveat to § 314A takes care to note that the writers of the 
Restatement “[express] no opinion as to whether there may not be 
other relations which impose a similar duty.”75 Comment (b) 
 
 68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). 
 69. Id. § 314A cmt. c (recognizing the law’s evolution to include limited duties to rescue in 
“situations in which there was some special relation between the parties”). 
 70. KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 373. 
 71. Id. at 374. 
 72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A. 
 73. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 56, at 374 (“In such relationships the plaintiff is 
typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, 
correspondingly, holds considerable power over the plaintiff’s welfare.”). These patterns have 
also been classified as stemming from the “ability condition” and the “dependency condition.” 
Lipkin, supra note 11, at 264–65. 
 74. See Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, 46 
DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 318 (1997) (discussing in part “how the weakness of the argument to limit 
liability makes remote-rescue cases more appealing cases to courts than some other rescue cases 
in which the fear of unlimited liability is greater”). 
 75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A caveat. 
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emphasizes the “question . . . left open by the Caveat,” but notes that 
even so “[t]he law appears . . . to be working slowly toward a 
recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence 
or of mutual dependence.”76 More helpfully, the comment pinpoints 
the commonality among the four duties, that is, that they “arise out of 
special relations between the parties, which create a special 
responsibility, and take the case out of the general rule.”77 
The meaning and extent of these “special relationships” has been 
the subject of many cases that take up the question of § 314A. The 
results have generally aligned with the four duties specifically 
prescribed. Cases such as Thornton v. City of Flint,78 which recognized 
a special relationship between the city and an incarcerated plaintiff 
injured on the premises,79 and Brown v. Knight,80 which found a 
special relationship between the host of a summer-school picnic and a 
young child injured while there,81 both conform to the Restatement 
view that there is a special relationship when one voluntarily takes 
custody of another.82 
Similarly, courts have often refused to find a special relationship 
that would warrant a duty to rescue when the situation does not align 
with one of the scenarios outlined in § 314A. In Iseberg v. Gross,83 an 
Illinois court found no special relationship between business 
partners,84 some of whom had failed to tell another partner that an 
investor had made threats on his life.85 In so doing, the court rejected 
the plaintiff’s theory that the special relationship limitation had been 
eroded to the point that it was “out of step with contemporary 
 
 76. Id. § 314A cmt. b. 
 77. Id.; see also id. (“The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are not 
necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or protection of 
another may be found. There may be other such relations, as for example that of husband and 
wife, where the duty is recognized by the criminal law, but there have as yet been no decisions 
allowing recovery in tort in jurisdictions where negligence actions between husband and wife for 
personal injuries are permitted. The question is therefore left open by the Caveat, preceding 
Comment a above. The law appears, however, to be working slowly toward a recognition of the 
duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”). 
 78. Thornton v. City of Flint, 197 N.W.2d 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972). 
 79. Id. at 493. 
 80. Brown v. Knight, 285 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1972). 
 81. Id. at 791–92. 
 82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4). 
 83. Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 2007). 
 84. Id. at 292. 
 85. Id. at 282. 
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societal morals.”86 The notion that the “affirmative 
duty . . . particularly in situations where the parties are not strangers, 
should be a policy determination, made on a case-by-case basis” was 
precluded by the special relationship requirement of § 314A.87 
In some cases, however, courts have used the common principles 
behind § 314A to find a special relationship not explicitly described 
by the Restatement. It is these sorts of cases that characterize a steady 
move away from the strict common law adherence to the no-duty 
rule, or even the four Restatement exceptions. The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, for instance, found a special relationship between an 
owner of a farm and a minor guest who was sexually abused by the 
owner’s boyfriend,88 reasoning that the plaintiff, as a child, had no 
“normal opportunities for self-protection.”89 In Furek v. University of 
Delaware,90 heralded as the case that marked the end of the 
bystander,91 the Delaware Supreme Court created a special 
relationship between a university and a student injured during 
fraternity hazing activities.92 The court based its decision upon two 
§ 314A exceptions: voluntary assumption of another93 and business 
invitee status.94 Additionally, decisions such as the 2002 case of 
Schieszler v. Ferrum College,95 in which a federal court found a special 
relationship between a university and a student that legally compelled 
the university to take reasonable measures to prevent his suicide,96 
 
 86. Id. at 288–89. 
 87. Id. at 288. 
 88. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. 2007). 
 89. Id. at 666; see also id. at 665–67 (analyzing whether a special relationship existed). 
 90. Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991). 
 91. ROBERT D. BICKEL & PETER F. LAKE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
MODERN UNIVERSITY: WHO ASSUMES THE RISKS OF COLLEGE LIFE? 127–30 (1999). 
 92. Furek, 594 A.2d at 519; see also Kathleen Connolly Butler, Shared Responsibility: The 
Duty to Legal Externs, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 84 (2003) (“The court rejected the idea that [the] 
‘student and the university operate at arms-length, with the student responsible for exercising 
judgment for his or her own protection when dealing with other students or student groups.’ 
Given the nature of the relationship, the duty owed was limited, but a duty was owed.” (quoting 
Furek, 594 A.2d at 517)). 
 93. Furek, 594 A.2d at 517 n.8. 
 94. Id. at 522 n.17. 
 95. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
 96. Id. at 611; see also Heather E. Moore, University Liability When Students Commit 
Suicide: Expanding the Scope of the Special Relationship, 40 IND. L. REV. 423, 431 (2007) 
(discussing the case in some detail and noting that it was the first signal to universities that the 
law relating to liability and suicide was in flux). 
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suggest a pattern of expansion of the duty beyond the four 
Restatement exceptions. 
These shifts have also been captured in Good Samaritan statutes 
at the state level. Massachusetts,97 Minnesota,98 Rhode Island,99 
Wisconsin,100 and Vermont101 are a sampling of states with an 
 
 97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002). The statute provides that: 
Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, murder, 
manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall, to the extent 
that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, report said 
crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable. 
Any person who violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five 
hundred nor more than two thousand and five hundred dollars. 
Id. 
 98. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008). The statute provides that: 
Duty to assist. A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person 
is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person 
can do so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain 
aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. A person who violates this 
subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. 
Id. 
 99. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (2002). The statute provides that: 
§ 11-37-3.1 Duty to report sexual assault. – Any person, other than the victim, who 
knows or has reason to know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted first 
degree sexual assault is taking place in his or her presence shall immediately notify 
the state police or the police department of the city or town in which the assault or 
attempted assault is taking place of the crime. 
§ 11-37-3.2 Necessity of complaint from victim. – No person shall be charged under 
§ 11-37-3.1 unless and until the police department investigating the incident obtains 
from the victim a signed complaint against the person alleging a violation of § 11-37-
3.1. 
§ 11-37-3.3 Failure to report – Penalty. – Any person who knowingly fails to report a 
sexual assault or attempted sexual assault as required under § 11-37-3.1 shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both. 
§ 11-37-3.4 – Immunity from liability. – Any person participating in good faith in 
making a report pursuant to § 11-37-3.1 shall have immunity from any liability, civil or 
criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any participant shall have the 
same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting from 
the report. 
Id. 
 100. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002). The statute provides, in relevant part: 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the 
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without 
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others. 
  . . . . 
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not 
more than $100.00. 
Id. 
 101. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005). The statute provides, in relevant part: 
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affirmative duty to rescue.102 Although these statutes demand action 
in only some form, and in only some cases, and none provide for 
prison time of more than one year103 or penalties of more than $2500 
for failure to act,104 the relatively new requirements are in keeping 
with a general trend that moves the law further down the continuum 
into what was once strictly a moral realm. 
Minnesota requires “[a] person at the scene of an emergency 
who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave 
physical harm” to “give reasonable assistance” as long as he can do so 
without posing a danger to himself or others.105 The law takes care to 
note that this can simply mean contacting law enforcement or medical 
personnel.106 The Rhode Island statute is almost identical, though it 
does not provide an example of “reasonable assistance.”107 
Massachusetts, on the other hand, requires only that a witness to 
certain enumerated crimes—“aggravated rape, rape, murder, 
manslaughter or armed robbery”—report the crime to law 
 
(1)(a) Whoever violates sub. (2)(a) is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor. 
  . . . . 
(2)(a) Any person who knows that a crime is being committed and that a victim is 
exposed to bodily harm shall summon law enforcement officers or other assistance or 
shall provide assistance to the victim. 
  . . . . 
(d) A person need not comply with this subsection if any of the following apply: 
1. Compliance would place him or her in danger. 
2. Compliance would interfere with duties the person owes to others. 
3. In the circumstances described under par. (a), assistance is being summoned or 
provided by others. 
Id. 
 102. Some other states also maintain various forms of a duty to rescue statute. See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. § 794.027 (2009) (requiring one who “observes the commission of the crime of sexual 
battery” to “seek assistance for the victim or victims by immediately reporting such offense to a 
law enforcement officer”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (“[N]o 
person, knowing that a felony has been or is being committed, shall knowingly fail to report 
such information to law enforcement authorities.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.160 (2009) 
(describing the “crime of failing to summon assistance”). This Note discusses just five such 
statutes. 
 103. The Rhode Island law allows the possibility of up to one year of imprisonment. R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.3. 
 104. Failure to report the enumerated witnessed crimes in Massachusetts carries a fine of 
between $500 and $2500. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002). 
 105. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 01 (2008). 
 106. Id. 
 107. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4. The law also pertains only to first-degree sexual 
assault. Id. § 11-37.3.1. 
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enforcement as soon as reasonably practicable, provided this can be 
done without danger to oneself or others.108 Wisconsin’s variation of a 
Good Samaritan statute compels a duty to aid a victim or “summon 
law enforcement officers or other assistance” if it would not place the 
actor in danger or interfere with duties owed to others.109 One is also 
not required to act if help has already been called or is being provided 
or if the instance has already been reported to law enforcement 
officials.110 But Wisconsin narrows the duty by requiring these actions 
only when one “knows that a crime is being committed.”111 
Interestingly, by addressing only criminal acts, this leaves to die the 
baby on the railroad tracks.112 Finally, Vermont requires “reasonable 
assistance” when one “knows that another is exposed to grave 
physical harm,” but does not expressly require that the rescuer in fact 
be at the scene of the emergency.113 
Taken together, there seems to be a crucial tradeoff at play in the 
approach of these five states. Wisconsin and Massachusetts require a 
duty to aid only when a crime is being committed—the former 
commanding action for the witness of any crime,114 and the latter 
requiring action only in the case of particular crimes.115 But, in 
exchange, two of the three states that more broadly require action 
even when the potential rescuee is not the victim of a crime—
Minnesota and Rhode Island—narrow the duty by requiring the 
rescuer to be at the scene of the emergency.116 The third, Vermont, 
cuts a broader swath through both of these requirements: the rescuer 
need have only knowledge (not be present at the scene) and that 
knowledge need be only of a danger (not necessarily of a crime).117 
Despite their intriguing drafting differences, many 
commonalities among the statutes are striking. All five states insist 
upon some form of aid only if that aid would not present a harm or 
 
 108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40. 
 109. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 2005). 
 110. Id. § 940.34(2)(d)(3). 
 111. Id. § 940.34(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
 112. See supra Part I. 
 113. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002). 
 114. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a). 
 115. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002). 
 116. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (2002). 
 117. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a). 
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danger to oneself or others.118 Two of the states further constrict the 
duty by using the term “reasonable assistance,”119 and Massachusetts 
essentially defines the term “reasonable” by itemizing the only crimes 
that require action if witnessed.120 Three of the states—Minnesota, 
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin—note that simply enlisting some form 
of professional aid may suffice.121 
These similarities reveal a sense of the tight, constrained nature 
of the duty, described in ways that are almost visibly painstaking and 
deliberate. Layer upon layer of constricting stipulations narrowing 
the duty are only punctuated by the statutes’ comparably light 
penalties. Only Rhode Island and Wisconsin provide for potential 
prison time—the former for up to one year, the latter for up to just 
thirty days—but both statutes offer the alternative of fines up to 
$500.122 Massachusetts provides for the greatest fines—up to $2500123—
whereas Minnesota provides for a fine of up to $300,124 and 
Vermont—perhaps tempering its more liberal view of the duty—does 
the same.125 Further, the minimal amount of prosecution under these 
statutes may emphasize the apparent hesitancy to force the issue126 or 
the dearth of situations in which people act—and are caught acting—
with callous disregard for another’s plight. 
The Restatement, case law, and statutes have added much to the 
ongoing discussion of the duty to rescue. But so far, that discussion 
has been primarily dominated by two camps: the autonomists in favor 
of a limited duty and the utilitarian humanitarians in favor of 
expanding it. As a result, the debate has neglected to fully consider 
 
 118. This interpretation presumes that the Wisconsin statute’s provision that the action not 
“interfere with duties the person owes to others,” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d), includes a 
duty of not posing a danger to others. 
 119. MINN. STAT. § 604A.01(1) subdiv. 1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a). 
 120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40. 
 121. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d). 
 122. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3.3 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(1)(a) (making violations 
a Class C misdemeanor in reference to WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.51(3)(c)). 
 123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40. 
 124. Minnesota classifies a violation of its Good Samaritan statute as a petty misdemeanor, 
MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1, for which the penalty cannot exceed $300, id. § 609.02 subdiv. 
4a. 
 125. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(c) (2002). 
 126. See Benac, supra note 16 (quoting Duke University School of Law Professor Sara Sun 
Beale as noting that “there’s a fairly big feeling that if you want to be Mother Teresa, you can 
be Mother Teresa . . . . [b]ut putting yourself at risk or going out of your way is seen as a choice, 
not a socially enforceable obligation”). 
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another, separate element: the effect of expanding the duty on 
heroes. 
III.  HEROES AND THE DUTY TO RESCUE 
If the law’s initial reaction was to favor the rescuer by protecting 
his duty not to aid, then its more recent approach has been to begin to 
side with the rescuee. But this humanitarian argument focuses on 
bettering the situations of two of the three key players: the rescuee 
and society at large.127 That this approach limits the choices of the 
third player, the rescuer, has been well considered.128 What has not 
been thoroughly accounted for is society’s perception of the rescuer 
as he is forced by the law to commit acts that were once considered 
voluntary; that is, the repercussions of mandating good acts on the 
existence and understanding of heroes remain largely unexplored.129 
In sum, the reasons for imposing a duty to aid have centered on the 
benefits accrued by both the victim and a society that backs its ideals 
with the force of law, but less so on the rescuer and the detriments to 
a society—and its laws—that forces such moral choices by the threat 
of legal sanction. 
The argument about the importance of heroes in society relies on 
at least two propositions: one, that society understands what heroes 
are, and two, that they are valuable. The first warrants an attempt at 
defining heroes, the second an effort at describing why they matter. 
In other words, to understand that heroes should figure in the duty-
to-rescue discussion, it is necessary to contend with their meaning on 
both a definitional and social scale. This Part addresses each in turn, 
before going on to reckon with the potential consequences of 
expanding the duty to rescue. 
A. The Meaning of the Word “Hero” 
Society defines heroes rather messily.130 Generally, the term takes 
in a wide swath of possibilities. Heroes earn their moniker because 
they perform good deeds over time,131 because they are objects of 
 
 127. See supra note 62. 
 128. See supra Part I. 
 129. See supra note 7. 
 130. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 543 (10th ed. 1996) (defining 
hero as “a mythological or legendary figure . . . with great strength or ability; . . . a man admired 
for his achievements and noble qualities”). 
 131. See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
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societal respect,132 or because they act with bravery.133 Heroes might 
be people who sacrifice their lives134 or merely their time. They may 
even disagree with society’s perception of how much they have 
sacrificed. The observable tendency of people dubbed “heroes” to 
respond, “I don’t feel like a hero,”135 demonstrates the dilemma of 
defining the term: there is fundamental disagreement about what it 
means, even among those on whom society would bestow the title. 
Stemming from this definitional quandary, the simple fact that easy 
rescue does not seem reasonable to everyone—as illustrated by 
egregious acts that go uninterrupted by seemingly heartless 
bystanders136—often encourages proponents of expanding the duty.137 
This kind of problem requires a more thorough investigation of what 
is really reasonable. 
Society may find occasion to define heroes more specifically 
when there is a particular purpose behind doing so. The Carnegie 
Hero Fund Commission, for example, defines them in their specific 
application criteria. The Commission accepts as a candidate for the 
Carnegie Medal only a “civilian who voluntarily risks his or her life to 
an extraordinary degree while saving or attempting to save the life of 
another person. The rescuer must have no full measure of 
responsibility for the safety of the victim.”138 
Like duty-to-rescue law, the Carnegie Hero Fund concerns itself 
with momentary, physical rescue, rather than a broader conception of 
the term “hero.” Easy rescues like the ones mandated by Good 
Samaritan statutes are unlikely to qualify for recognition by the 
Carnegie Hero Fund. The kinds of rescuers who would qualify are 
precisely the kinds of heroes the law never expects—Carnegie’s latter 
requirement even seems to rule out the Restatement exceptions as 
possible situations in which a hero may emerge.139 It is appropriate, 
 
 132. See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
 133. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 134. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 135. This was the response of one woman honored by Yad Vashem, an Israeli organization 
that honors non-Jews who came to the aid of those persecuted by the Nazis. Geri J. Yonover, 
The Lessons of History: Holocaust Education in the United States Public Schools, 26 VT. L. REV. 
133, 146–47 (2001). 
 136. See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
 138. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, http://www.carnegiehero.org/heroFund.php (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
 139. The Commission’s requirement that the rescuer have no responsibility for the victim 
would rule out the four exceptions to the no-duty rule as outlined by § 314A, which delineates 
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therefore, that heroes dwell, by Carnegie’s own admission, at the 
extreme end of the moral spectrum. Unlike most definitions of 
heroes, there is some significance attached to making these 
stipulations precise: it narrows the field for the contest and assures 
that only the most “thrill[ing]” heroes—what Carnegie called the 
“heroes of civilization”140—receive recognition. 
Yet the pursuit of answers to the question considered by 
Carnegie and many others—what is heroic and what is simply 
reasonable—has thus far been a highly constrained topic in the rescue 
context. The law shies from the term,141 but implicates it by 
propagating exceptions to the no-duty rule. The Restatement 
exceptions suggest that reasonable rescues in those scenarios are not 
heroic in the eyes of the law—instead, they are expected. The same 
expectation goes for those professions that by their nature require 
rescue and whose duty to rescue is legally prescribed. In fact, under 
the “Firefighter’s Rule,” many professional rescuers are not 
permitted to recover damages incurred during the course of rescue—
instead, they are presumed to have assumed the risk of injury.142 What 
society may look upon with compassion and pity and in fact claim as 
heroic,143 the law views as part of an assumed duty, one made 
reasonable by occupation.144 
In sum, the debate surrounding the no-duty rule is at least in part 
a debate about what it means to be a hero. By expanding a rule to 
require certain conduct, the law implicitly defines that conduct as 
reasonable. But does this mean that the conduct is consequently not 
heroic? The differences between the social and legal approaches to 
defining the term is what makes answering such a question so 
 
situations in which the would-be rescuer does have full responsibility for the victim because of 
their relationship. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 140. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, supra note 138. 
 141. See, e.g., E.H. Loewry, AIDS and the Physician’s Fear of Contagion, 89 CHEST 325, 
325–26 (1986) (noting that society’s “expectations of ‘reasonable risk’ necessitates [sic] courage 
without demanding heroism”). 
 142. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
111, 116 (2008) (“Reckless conduct can provide a basis for recovery for injured professional 
rescuers, otherwise barred by the application of the so-called Firefighters’ Rule.”). 
 143. E.g., Deborah Young, Sunday Morning Mayhem: FDNY Hero Perishes Battling House 
Blaze, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Nov. 24, 2008, at A01. 
 144. This is in keeping with tort law’s tendency to view foreseeability as a necessary 
component to fault. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 29, at 162 (discussing the importance 
of foresight in tort). It also conforms to George P. Fletcher’s view that a layman’s duty to rescue 
infringes upon individual liberty at least in part because the rescue is demanded spontaneously, 
and is therefore unforeseeable. See supra note 37. 
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complex. Society applies the term to one who makes everyday 
sacrifices in raising his children145 or injures himself in rescuing others 
from burning buildings;146 the law, however, is unconcerned with the 
former and offers no recourse for the latter.147 The social and legal 
realms, like the moral and legal realms, view the question of who is a 
hero quite differently. 
B. The Significance of Heroes 
If heroes were not valuable, society would not care about a rule 
that shrinks their realm. Societies value heroes and heroic acts for 
reasons that are not always explicit, but that are better ferreted out 
from the way in which heroes are discussed and interpreted. 
Historically, heroes have enjoyed a kind of cult status. The word 
derives from the ancient Greek, heros, which is thought to derive 
from a word related to the English word “year”—a linguistic 
connection that reflects the seasonal schedule on which heroes were 
worshipped.148 Public praise was essential to the nature of heroes, who 
were given their title because they “achieved immortality through the 
local community’s memory and continuing esteem for them.”149 
Herakles, the most famous of the Greek heroes, serves as a 
paradigmatic illustration. Defined primarily by his physical prowess, 
not by any artistic skill, Herakles became famous for his many labors, 
which tended to include brave, decisive physical action such as killing 
dangerous animals.150 
In contemporary culture, heroes retain many of their historic 
virtues, and communities continue to admire them in similar ways. 
Many modern heroes also take brave and decisive physical action. 
Yet a hero need not orchestrate physical violence; instead, the hero 
often prevents it. President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 State of the Union 
Address, for instance, referenced a government official who had 
rescued a woman just two weeks before. The anecdote buttressed the 
inspirational tone of his message: 
  Just 2 weeks ago, in the midst of a terrible tragedy on the 
Potomac, we saw again the spirit of American heroism at its finest—
 
 145. See infra note 166. 
 146. Young, supra note 143. 
 147. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 148. RICHARD P. MARTIN, MYTHS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS 145 (2003). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 150–53. 
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the heroism of dedicated rescue workers saving crash victims from 
icy waters. And we saw the heroism of one of our young 
Government employees, Lenny Skutnik, who, when he saw a 
woman lose her grip on the helicopter line, dived into the water and 
dragged her to safety. 
  . . . . 
  . . . Don’t let anyone tell you that America’s best days are behind 
her . . . . We’ve seen it triumph too often in our lives to stop 
believing in it now.151 
Heroes are intended to be inspirational figures and have, in fact, 
inspired others to take real action. In 1904, an explosion in a mine 
near Harwick, Pennsylvania left 181 dead—two among the death toll 
perished while trying to rescue others.152 The story is what encouraged 
Andrew Carnegie to establish the Carnegie Hero Foundation, which 
annually pays tribute to fifty individuals for heroic deeds, and has so 
far awarded more than nine thousand medals and $30 million in 
grants to heroes and their survivors.153 
Heroic acts have also been depicted as exercises in freedom,154 
despite the common law perception that legally requiring those acts 
would be quite the opposite.155 Heroic acts have worked as tools of 
absolution, too—as in the case of Idaho prisoners, who may seek 
reduced sentences as a reward for heroic deeds performed while in 
the penitentiary.156 And for those who believe in spiritual absolution, 
heroic acts are rewarded with promised recognition in the afterlife as 
well.157 
As in ancient times, the formal ways in which heroes are 
recognized also serve as a proxy for their social value. In addition to 
 
 151. Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress Reporting on the State of 
the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 72, 78–79 (Jan. 26, 1982). This stands in stark contrast to the idea of 
the no-duty rule as distinctly American. See supra Part I. 
 152. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, supra note 54. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Anthony M. Kennedy, Law and Belief, TRIAL, July 1998, at 23, 24 (“[W]hen our heroes 
are counted, they will be ones who recognized that individual responsibility is a celebration of 
freedom, not its denial.”). 
 155. See supra Part I. 
 156. Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law Impose 
a Duty to Help Endangered Persons or Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991, 993 
(2000). 
 157. See supra note 49. 
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acknowledgment from the highest office in the land, newspapers 
regularly relish heroic tales with catchy headlines and portraits of 
admirable protagonists.158 Further, organizations such as the Carnegie 
Hero Foundation and Yad Vashem, which honors non-Jews who 
came to the aid of those persecuted during the Nazi takeover,159 exist 
to identify and praise heroes. Less formally, some communities have 
established college funds for the survivors of those killed in the 
performance of heroic acts.160 Even jury nullification may reveal a 
respect for a hero who fails in his heroic effort. In Eckert v. Long 
Island Railroad Co.,161 the jury had refused to find that the decedent, 
who perished while rescuing a four-year-old boy from the path of an 
oncoming train, was contributorily negligent, finding instead that 
death was not foreseeable.162 The New York Court of Appeals 
declined to overturn the verdict.163 One commentator noted that the 
nature of the act seems to have persuaded the court that “[s]uch a 
heroic effort was clearly worthy of community approbation in spite of 
the foreseeability of death.”164 Posthumous praise for the hero was so 
important that it trumped application of the law. 
To the extent that presidents, newspapers, organizations, and 
juries represent a community and its beliefs, these examples support a 
more abstract contention: the decision to uphold someone as a hero 
can provide insights about the community itself. This social 
barometer function of heroes has both anthropological and 
philosophical value; the presence of heroes—or lack thereof—has 
been used to interpret the aspirations and norms of the country.165 
 
 158. E.g., Football Hero, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 11, 1983, at 18; Jimmie Tramel, True 
Hero’s Gift of Life Remembered, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 25, 2005, at B3. 
 159. See Yonover, supra note 135, at 146–47. 
 160. See Franklin & Ploeger, supra note 156, at 996. 
 161. Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). 
 162. Id. at 506. 
 163. Id. at 508. 
 164. Jay Tidmarsh, A Process Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1383 n.247 
(1994). 
 165. See Finkel, supra note 32, at 249 (“[A] number of media and social commentators were 
quick to conclude that these modern anecdotal stories of horrors without civic-minded actions 
reflected a decline in civic duty.”); Ted Gest, Are Good Samaritans a Vanishing Breed?, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1983, at 9 (offering reasons for the decline in unsolicited rescue, 
including the possibility that it is due to “an increasingly impersonal U.S. society”); Austin 
Wehrwein, Enforcement Uncertain: ‘Samaritan’ Law Poses Difficulties, NATL. L.J., Aug. 22, 
1983, at 5 (describing the representative who introduced the Minnesota rescue bill as expressing 
that “[t]he traditional common-law rule that a bystander has no duty to aid an endangered 
person would permit ‘totally unacceptable conduct for civilized society’”); Ruth Youngblood, 
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And yet this valuable social construct—like hope, aspiration, and 
absolution—cannot survive without the existence of the fundamental 
social value of heroes. The most critical value corresponds with the 
supposition with which the law is most occupied: heroes do good acts. 
In the duty-to-rescue context, they aid people in momentary and dire 
situations that threaten severe bodily harm and even death.166 The 
utilitarian aspect of heroes is the foundational argument for 
expanding the duty to rescue.167 It is also at the heart of the debate 
over the pros and cons of legislating heroism. 
C. The Consequences to Heroes of Expanding the Duty 
There are two ways in which heroes experience negative 
consequences as a result of expanding the duty to rescue. This Section 
first discusses the problem that stems from the disconnect between 
social and legal norms that results from chipping away at the 
distinction between the ordinary man and the hero. Tangentially, 
blurring this line also makes for more confusion about the meaning of 
a heroic act. This Section then addresses counterarguments to these 
claims. Finally, this Section closes by offering an on-the-ground 
picture of how legislatures tend to enact statutory expansions of the 
duty that heightens these theoretical concerns. Such statutes often 
arise under reactionary public pressure, resulting in overbroad laws 
that wrongly assume they can legislate moral acts. This pattern 
threatens to infringe further upon the realm of heroes by failing to 
fully evaluate potential effects on heroes in the fray. 
 
Rapes Trigger Calls for New Laws, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 1983, at 3D (“The degeneration of 
one person is the degeneration of us all . . . . If a community like ours can solve the problem, 
then cities and towns all over the country will seize upon the solution.” (quoting the mayor of 
New Bedford, the town in which a young woman was raped in a bar while at least a dozen men 
watched)). 
 166. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 180. Most classic examples of the rule are cases 
involving a life-saving rescue. The murder of Kitty Genovese, the public rape of a young woman 
on a pool table, and the rape and murder of Sherrice Iverson in Las Vegas—all credited with 
incentivizing duty-to-rescue legislation—similarly involve dire situations. See infra notes 193–
201. Consequently, this Note’s discussion focuses on heroes who perform these sorts of acts, 
rather than other kinds of heroes, often so called because they perform good deeds over a 
longer period of time. See Reagan, supra note 151, at 78 (“And then there are countless quiet, 
everyday heroes of American life—parents who sacrifice long and hard so their children will 
know a better life than they’ve known . . . .”). Society seems to value both kinds. 
 167. See, e.g., Philip W. Romohr, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical 
Foundations of the No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1037 (2006) (“Utilitarians 
generally support a duty to rescue others, at least to the extent that such a duty provides 
maximum satisfaction to the most people.”). 
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1. Expanding the Duty to Rescue Diminishes the Concept of the 
Hero and Confuses the Law.  Overlapping concepts of heroic and 
ordinary acts means a loss for society, which understands and benefits 
from heroes because they are separate, moral entities. Heroes are 
meaningful because they are fundamentally unlike the rest of 
humankind. Historically, this respect was reflected in worship; today, 
it is revealed in other public forums, such as a State of the Union 
address or newspaper stories.168 But regardless of how society comes 
together to pay tribute to them, heroes depend on a community that 
holds them up as worthy—and fundamentally separate from the 
general populace—for their meaning and their power. Taking heroes 
off the pedestal—or confusing the height of the pedestal—by 
transforming moral choice into the realm of reasonable choice means 
that this clear, necessary separation is lost. If part of the meaning of 
heroes is derived from separateness, then lumping them in with the 
ordinary man fundamentally changes their meaning and likely makes 
them mean less. 
This results in fewer opportunities for inspiration, absolution, 
and spiritual reward, and for the organizations and news media that 
uphold heroes as exemplary to inspire others through consistent and 
public recognition of heroic acts. It means a lesser role for heroes as 
indicators of society’s nature and aspirations, or as societal 
barometers. But it also means a loss for the law, because a clearer 
understanding of what is reasonable is lost. Again and again, the law 
proclaims that it does not require heroes.169 Instead, their presence 
helps to define the most perplexing of all tort creatures by showing 
what he is not: the reasonable man. By expanding the duty to rescue, 
the law takes on a word with almost exclusively social meaning. In so 
doing, it takes on the imprecise social handling of heroes—what they 
do and what they mean—and makes them the business of the law. In 
short, it turns philosophical questions into legal problems. 
Granted, it may be that under special conditions, some acts that 
society deems heroic will be deemed reasonable and thus expected by 
the law—the two terms are not always mutually exclusive. Firemen 
are a prime example. Society celebrates their heroism, and the law 
 
 168. See infra Part III.B. 
 169. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 7, at 261 (“Acts that are beyond the call of duty demand 
of the agent extraordinary heroism or sacrifice, and ‘while we praise their performance, we do 
not condemn their non-performance.’” (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 
219 (5th ed. 1893))). 
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sees their actions as reasonable. But in that case, the duties of a 
fireman are explicitly prescribed by law,170 formally taught in a 
training school,171 and voluntarily accepted far in advance. The stamp 
of the law over a heroic duty in a context without such structure is 
likely to cause far more confusion in comparison to this narrow 
circumstance in which people elect to take on a dangerous duty to 
help others through their occupation in public safety. 
Further, the claim that “anyone would do it” or even that the 
conduct is “reasonable” does not mean that the law should 
necessarily require the act. This view confuses widespread agreement 
about what ought to be done with a mandate for legal obligation.172 
Just because everyone would do it does not mean that everyone 
should do it, nor does it mean that a normative argument should be 
backed by force of law. Even if reasonable action is not necessarily 
the opposite of heroic action, the two terms help to define one 
another indirectly.173 The stamp of law, however, forces the two into 
an odd dichotomy. 
In addition to taking on a broad view of heroes that is merely 
inconsistent, requiring rescue may also invite problems relating to 
strong disagreements about what defines a hero. For autonomists who 
believe that the right to be left alone is more important than ensuring 
that the baby be rescued from the railroad tracks, an easy rescue may 
constitute heroism, because even that rescue represents a decision to 
do something other than nothing. Gradations of this scenario force 
 
 170. See supra note 142. 
 171. E.g., Education Portal, Fireman Training, http://education-portal.com/fireman_training. 
html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 172. For a discussion of the interplay between social norms and the law, see generally Cass 
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). Sunstein notes that 
“[s]uccessful law and policy try to take advantage of learning about norms and norm change.” 
Id. at 909. But he also notes: “Many laws have an expressive function. They ‘make a statement’ 
about how much, and how, a good or bad should be valued. They are an effort to constitute and 
to affect social meanings, social norms, and social roles.” Id. at 964. 
 173. One particularly salient description of the interplay between duty, reasonableness, and 
heroics has arisen in the quasi-duty-to-rescue context of doctor responsibility in the face of the 
AIDS epidemic. See Loewry, supra note 141, at 325–26 (“Fear of coming to harm as a 
consequence of medical practice has been of concern to physicians at least since contagion has 
been recognized to exist. The balance among duty, fear, and courage has been a necessary part 
of medical practice ever since. . . . Society assumes that the contract [between the healer and the 
community] will be honored and the trust kept in time of need. Its expectations of ‘reasonable 
risk’ necessitates [sic] courage without demanding heroism. A definition of what is reasonable is 
inherent within the context of the situation abroad at the time. The contract is reasonable. It has 
endured over the ages and has been hallowed by use.”) 
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further questions about the precise degree of foregone opportunity or 
incurred risk necessary to deserve the word “hero.” For some, 
stopping to rescue the baby on the way to a job interview is heroism; 
for others, the act would only be heroic if the train were inches from 
the baby when the rescuer retrieved him. Such considerations suggest 
that heroism is in the eye of the beholder—that perhaps there is a 
general sense of what the term means, but, like the reasonable man, 
there is confusion at the margins. In addition, manipulating 
philosophical rather than factual hypothetical situations leads to a 
different kind of debate. 
Consider the requirements of the bystander as laid out by the 
statutory rules reviewed in Part II. Proponents of expanding the duty 
are right to note that the evolution of the law in Good Samaritan 
statutes tends to remain gradual.174 These statutes require relatively 
little action with relatively little penalty.175 It does not necessarily 
follow, however, that even small expansions of the duty do not 
threaten the stability of the hero as a social figure or a foil for the law. 
This is most easily seen in the tendency of society to label as “hero” 
one who performs precisely what in some states is required by law. A 
recent newspaper article, for example, described as “heroic” the 
actions of two co-workers, one of whom called 911 when the other 
was shot by an intruder.176 But in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin, enlisting the aid of emergency personnel in such a 
situation is required by law.177 The use of the term “hero” suggests 
that there is some disagreement on the legal and social definition of 
the term—what the law would prescribe as required “reasonable 
assistance,”178 society upholds as heroic. Even the smallest steps 
toward enlarging the duty, it seems, create inconsistencies between 
 
 174. See Yeager, supra note 7, at 24–25 (“[A] bystander’s duty does not include the heroism 
of invulnerability and infantile omnipotence.”). 
 175. See supra notes 97–126 and accompanying text. 
 176. Colleen Kenney, Night Shift from Hell . . . and Back; Jacque Bethune Is Recovering 
from a Gunshot Wound to the Mouth, a Crime Never Solved, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 16, 2008, at 
A1; see also Christina Hall, As Flames Tear Through Home, Warren Teen Becomes a Hero; 
Cops: Mom Drugged Kids’ Hot Chocolate, Set Fire, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 20, 2008, at A1 
(describing a 13-year-old boy who guided his sister out of a burning house and called 911 as a 
“hero”). Failure to perform the act in the latter case would violate the Minnesota and Wisconsin 
statutes. See supra notes 106–07, 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1 (2008); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005). 
 178. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 subdiv. 1. 
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social and legal understandings of rescue acts and begin to diminish 
the understanding of heroes. 
To the extent that “reasonable assistance” remains undefined in 
these statutes, the distinction between heroic and non-heroic acts 
becomes even more difficult. In Vermont, calling for emergency 
personnel is not explicitly described as satisfying the statute.179 Is the 
man who witnesses a shooting and calls 911 simply a law-abiding 
citizen or a hero? What if he then rushes to the victim’s aid, bringing 
a gun along in case the attacker returns? What if he then stays with 
the victim until police arrive, periodically shaking him to keep him 
awake? Does it matter that the rescuer and victim later learn that the 
attacker is a wanted serial killer? Or that the victim calls the other 
man a “hero”? Paul Patrick, who narrowly escaped the “Serial 
Shooter,” uses the word to describe Saul Guerrero, who came to his 
aid in each of these ways on the evening of June 8, 2006.180 But at what 
point did he actually become one? 
Under the Vermont statute, it remains unclear at what point 
Guerrero transforms from the reasonable man into the hero. This is 
true regardless of whether a rescuer like Guerrero would ever 
realistically be prosecuted under either statute. The point is that the 
mere existence of the requirement of “reasonable assistance” creates 
confusion that has a real and palpable effect on an understanding of 
the difference between reasonable and heroic actors. 
2. Response to Counterarguments.  It is crucial to address 
valuable counterarguments to these points. Those in favor of the duty 
to rescue might argue that an expansion of the rule will increase all of 
the social values that heroes already promote and allow for more 
examples of persons to emulate, more opportunities for absolution, 
more cause for public celebration both formally and informally, 
spiritual compensation in the afterlife, a social barometer that reflects 
a more moral nation, and—the utilitarian’s ultimate goal—more 
people saved from injury and death. It follows that the benefit of 
normalizing certain good behaviors is that it encourages or even 
forces conformity.181 
 
 179. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002). 
 180. Nick R. Martin, Bearing Witness Against Serial Shooter Suspect: Valley Man Shot in 
2006 Testifies, Tells of Life Since Then, MESA TRIB. (Ariz.), Nov. 16, 2008, at A2. 
 181. See Sunstein, supra note 172, at 910 (“Norms can tax or subsidize choice. Collective 
action—in the form of information campaigns, persuasion, economic incentives, or legal 
coercion—may be necessary to enable people to change norms that they do not like.”). 
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But these social values will exist in an altered form. The social 
barometer function of heroes, for instance, is likely to function less 
meaningfully if those heroes are acting out of a sense of obligation. 
The barometer would better reflect the law itself, rather than those 
acting under it, because the decision to expand the duty would tend to 
reveal a society committed to the perpetration of good deeds in name 
(making it more difficult to measure or identify those good deeds 
committed out of true altruism). Similarly, the law would confuse 
those trying to determine whom to emulate and about whom to run 
inspirational new stories. As in Eckert,182 even when citizens seem 
capable of recognizing heroes in spite of the law, they will be forced 
to choose between a social and legal understanding of the term. The 
confusion that results from such a forced choice—regardless of how 
the choice is made—is the damaging aspect of expanding the duty. 
Because something at least closer to heroism will be required by law, 
the social force of these values are likely to mean at least something 
different, and will probably come to mean something less. 
Those in favor of expanding the duty may note another kind of 
social force also under threat in modern society—religion. If the 
common law presumed that religiously inspired altruism would fill 
any holes left by a lack of a duty to rescue,183 then a decline in religion 
would suggest it can no longer suffice as a remedy. This argument 
encounters several problems. First, it is far from clear that religion is 
experiencing a downturn.184 Second, the argument presumes that a 
moral sensibility unguided by official religious doctrine could 
persuade at least an easy rescue. Finally, adoption of this stance takes 
on the weakness of the common law presumption that law must shine 
a light wherever there is moral darkness (or, as the common law saw 
it, that there was no need for such a light where morality already 
existed).185 The concern about religion’s shortcomings would make an 
ironic argument against more fully allowing the spiritual growth of 
 
 182. For the description of a situation in which a jury nullified in favor of a man who 
attempted to save a child from an oncoming train, see supra notes 160–63 and accompanying 
text. 
 183. See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text. 
 184. Neela Banerjee, Changing Faiths: More Americans than Ever Are Leaving Childhood 
Affiliations Behind and Making Their Own Decisions About Religion, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, 
Apr. 4, 2008, at 12–13 (noting that an increase in the percentage of people who claim to be 
unaffiliated with a particular religion “does not mean that Americans are becoming less 
religious”). 
 185. See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text. 
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society in another way—by ensuring that its law does not infringe 
upon the clear definition of its heroes. 
Proponents will also posit that these intangible costs will be more 
than made up for by the concrete and worthy result of lifesaving.186 
Bystanders on their own will be required to rescue those in peril, thus 
decreasing the cost of undertakings by professional rescuers, who 
would benefit from a society that demanded laypersons chip in.187 This 
is the same kind of argument made for expanding the duty in the face 
of complaints about cost to individual autonomy: the large gain of life 
trumps the small loss of liberty,188 and the law is a relatively 
inexpensive way to shift the norm toward rescue.189 
But the values lost are not necessarily comparable. And both 
kinds of arguments jettison criticisms about the costs of norm shifting 
by assuming that the norm actually needs shifting. At least one recent 
empirical study shows that a failure to rescue is actually the 
exception—not the norm.190 The widespread agreement that easy 
rescue seems reasonable may also indicate that the norm of rescue in 
some situations already exists, and that therefore legal sanction is 
unnecessary.191 Further, this kind of cost-benefit analysis also runs the 
risk of assuming that simply because social values are not concretely 
measurable, they are somehow less important. 
 
 186. See Adler, supra note 1, at 918–19 (“[W]hat society loses in the goodness of 
volunteerism, it will recoup in the reduction of blameworthy conduct.”). 
 187. See Lipkin, supra note 11, at 258 (“A general legal duty to rescue would save lives and 
reduce the cost of rescue operations.”). 
 188. See id. at 288 (“Adopting the harm principle restricts the individual’s freedom to 
interfere with and injure others, but enhances his overall freedom by rendering the avenues 
traversed through life relatively safe and predictably free from avoidable injury and death. This 
sort of calculation is the hallmark of individualism and the first principle of prudential 
reasoning.”). 
 189. See Sunstein, supra note 172, at 908 (“A regulatory policy that targets social norms may 
well be the cheapest and most effective strategy available to a government seeking to discourage 
risky behavior.”). 
 190. See David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to 
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 656 (2006) (“[P]roven cases of non-rescues are extraordinarily 
rare, and proven cases of rescues are exceedingly common—often in hazardous circumstances, 
where a duty to rescue would not apply in the first instance.”). Strong and widespread negative 
public reactions to bad bystanders may also suggest that the norm does not need changing. See 
infra notes 193–201. 
 191. This would seem to reveal that the so-called problem is less than imagined, and that the 
moral duty to rescue is quietly present. See Sunstein, supra note 172, at 912 (“[W]hen social 
norms appear not to be present, it is only because they are so taken for granted that they seem 
invisible.”). 
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But those in favor of the duty to rescue do maintain one 
particularly strong contention: that the law will only require 
reasonable or perhaps even easy rescue,192 thereby counteracting all 
or at least many of these concerns. If only the most basic and least 
dangerous acts of rescue are required, then heroes remain free to 
roam the realm of truly heroic acts, maintaining their separate status 
and allowing society a full range of their values and the law an 
untouched understanding of the reasonable man. But although the 
easy rescue is an easy choice for the utilitarian, it is not a concept 
likely to be so easily accepted, legislated, or defined for society as a 
whole—especially the autonomist. Like the word hero, the meaning 
of an easy rescue depends on the would-be rescuer; and differing 
views on its meaning confuse the social value of one who rescues: the 
hero. Even reasonable rescue threatens the understanding and 
meaning of heroes, both because it addresses a concept (heroism) 
that varies according to the viewer and because it blurs the line 
between the ordinary and the great upon which the very definition of 
heroism depends. But if the argument only runs that easy rescue is all 
that will ever be asked of a bystander, a cogent response—because 
the claim is based upon a prediction about the likely evolution of the 
duty to rescue—requires a closer look at how these laws actually 
evolve. 
3. Legislatures Heighten Theoretical Concerns by Rashly 
Expanding Duties to Rescue.  A closer look at the genesis of duty-to-
rescue statutes and comparable provisions reveals that the conditions 
under which many of the statutes have been enacted are further 
reason for pause when considering the expansion of the duty against 
the backdrop of heroes. 
Three of the five states discussed in this Note with criminal 
penalties for failing to act in an emergency created their statutes in 
response to a particularly horrifying and well-publicized occasion of 
what has come to be known as “spectator rape.”193 On March 6, 1983, 
a young woman was repeatedly raped on a pool table by four men in 
Big Dan’s Tavern in New Bedford, Massachusetts, while at least a 
dozen other men looked on.194 The public outcry was swift and strong; 
 
 192. See Adler, supra note 1, at 918 (“Actions that are beyond the call of duty will not be 
legally required in any case, so the law will not deprive society of heroes nor deprive individuals 
of all opportunities to perform heroically.”). 
 193. Finkel, supra note 32, at 248. 
 194. Ellen Goodman, Op-Ed, Horror Show in a Tavern, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1983. 
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almost immediately, legislators in Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
began clamoring for a change in witness liability law195 and were 
ultimately successful in passing duty to aid statutes.196 Democratic 
representative Randy Staten also cited the New Bedford rape as the 
reason for introducing the bill that is now Minnesota law.197 
Although the resulting statute does not fall strictly within the 
realm of duty-to-rescue statutes, history repeated itself in strikingly 
similar circumstances fifteen years later, when a similar nationwide 
uproar resulted after seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson was attacked in 
a Las Vegas casino bathroom while the attacker’s friend and 
classmate, David Cash, watched from a nearby stall. In response, 
California unanimously enacted the Sherrice Iverson Child Victim 
Protection Act, which created a duty to report child abuse and 
neglect.198 Nevada followed suit with a similar law.199 
The Iverson case, like the ones that preceded it, highlighted the 
traditionally widespread, emotional response to horrific cases in 
which bystanders choose to do nothing when rescue is easy and 
danger to the victim is great.200 Duty-to-rescue laws, because they are 
so often spurred on by an event overcharged with public sentiment, 
run the risk of encouraging impetuous legislation that fails to fully 
weigh the ramifications of expanding the duty—including the impact 
upon the moral realm of heroes. That this consideration may sound 
crass after a brief description of such a parade of callous witnesses 
only emphasizes the point that moral outrage easily colors more 
resigned, measured thought.201  
 
 195. Youngblood, supra note 165. 
 196. Silver, supra note 1, at 427. 
 197. Wehrwein, supra note 165. 
 198. Finkel, supra note 32, at 249. 
 199. Id. 
 200. The “David Cash case” resulted in three hundred newspaper articles nationwide. Susan 
B. Apel, Privacy in Genetic Testing: Why Women Are Different, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 14 
n.67; see also, e.g., Op-Ed, America’s Shame, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1, 1983 (“Americans reacted 
with understandable outrage recently when bystanders in a New Bedford bar acted as callous 
spectators to the crime of rape. We are now learning that American officials acted as accessories 
after the fact in aiding Nazis who took part in the slaughter of millions of innocent people. No 
moral outrage is commensurate with that crime.”). 
 201. Alan Dershowitz, who was quoted as the calmer voice of reason about the 
technicalities of expanding a duty in the wake of the New Bedford spectator rape case, 
recognized this pattern by noting: “We don’t want to make it a crime for someone to refuse to 
endanger his own life. . . . Law is often the product of the worst abuses in human nature.” 
Youngblood, supra note 165. The legend of the Kitty Genovese incident may also stand as an 
example of the potential for a particularly emotional reaction to an event to influence the 
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More measured thought would recognize that simply because 
one person fails to act morally in a particular instance does not mean 
that society as a whole would benefit from a change in the law 
requiring moral action. Instead, the social barometer function of 
heroes works just as well when society reacts to one who fails to act 
heroically, and a high degree of public outrage may indicate that the 
law that would prohibit the outrage-inducing conduct is not as 
necessary as it would seem. As one commentator noted in the 
aftermath of the Sherrice Iverson incident, “[t]he fact that the moral 
outrage is so deafening is an encouraging sign that the nation’s moral 
compass still works. That Mr. Cash isn’t being prosecuted means the 
justice system hasn’t gone haywire either.”202 
In addition to the potential of reactionary laws to overlook their 
ramifications upon heroic action and to incorrectly assume a general 
lack of moral good-doing based upon a single example, the impact of 
such legislation is also, in a practical sense, limited once passed. 
Actors are rarely—if ever—prosecuted under such statutes,203 a fact 
that may owe to the difficulty in tracing transgressors,204 particularly 
given the potential hesitancy on the part of eyewitnesses to be 
prosecuted for the same crime. Regardless of the reason for the lack 
of enforcement, putting these laws on the books threatens heroes by 
officially condoning a legal definition of the reasonable man that 
confuses the social meaning of heroes. This remains true regardless of 
the degree to which the laws are enforced. Should these young 
statutes serve as templates for future legislation by other states, this 
concern only multiplies. And given the potential political backlash of 
repeal, it will be difficult to reverse rash legislation in the future as 
well. 
On a more philosophical level, efforts to increase a duty to 
rescue are a reminder that “as the Cowardly Lion learned in Oz, 
courage is not something one person can give another or a legislature 
 
relating of that event. See Jim Rasenberger, Kitty, 40 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, § 14, 
at 1 (“Yeah, there was a murder. . . . Yeah, people heard something. You can question how a 
few people behaved. But this wasn’t 38 people watching a woman be slaughtered for 35 minutes 
and saying, ‘Oh, I don’t want to be involved.’” (quoting one who researched the incident forty 
years later)). 
 202. Editorial, ‘Good Samaritan’: Reaction Shows Public Is Not Indifferent, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 4, 1998, at 30A. 
 203. See Benac, supra note 16. 
 204. Silver, supra note 1, at 433 (noting that “nonrescuers would be difficult to trace, and 
nearly impossible when not witnessed by others”). 
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can pass for its constituents.”205 But in much the same way that it is 
irrelevant whether Saul Guerrero might have been prosecuted under 
these statutes had he failed to render the assistance that he did, it is 
also irrelevant in relation to the argument about the value of heroes 
whether these statutory efforts fail to bestow Oz-like power (or 
whether that is even their intent). In both cases, this legislation 
remains dangerous because it begins to unravel social and legal 
understandings of heroes that provide real value in both the social 
and legal contexts. 
It is for these reasons that proponents are oversimplifying the 
problem when they insist that expanding the duty to include easy 
rescue would leave the realm of heroes intact because “[a]ctions that 
are beyond the call of duty will not be legally required in any case.”206 
An examination of statutes that have already expanded the duty 
reveals that virtually any amount of legislation on the subject of 
rescue automatically invites questions about the realm of heroes. This 
is true even when bystanders are asked to perform relatively small 
tasks—such as enlisting emergency aid—because society considers 
even this action to be “heroic,” a term that flies in the face of statutes 
that claim to demand only “reasonable assistance.” As for cases in 
which those statutes do not specify such an example of “reasonable 
assistance,” the impact upon heroes is even more uncertain. And 
because these statutes likely make incorrect assumptions about the 
need for moralist legislation and its actual ability to change behavior, 
they likely counter—or at least cause further confusion about—what 
should be and can be expected of the reasonable man. 
That many of these statutes have origins in reactions to 
sensational (and perhaps sensationalized) single instances of 
bystander cruelty may explain why their enactors have failed to fully 
appreciate these and other ramifications. Proponents of expanding 
the duty who insist so early in the jurisprudence that the law will 
never head in the extreme direction of requiring unreasonable rescue 
forget that reason’s counterpart—emotion—has largely dictated the 
jurisprudence so far. In short, the assumption that the law will always 
be reasonable not only seems subject to suspicion based on past facts, 
 
 205. Timothy Harper, Duty to Help, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), Mar. 11, 1984, at 
A2. Andrew Carnegie seems to have agreed with this assessment. About establishing monies for 
heroes, he noted, “I do not expect to stimulate or create heroism by this fund, knowing well that 
heroic action is impulsive.” Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, supra note 54. 
 206. Adler, supra note 1, at 918. 
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but is also dangerous for the future. If the assumption is true, then 
dismissing the discussion of ramifications to heroes only shortchanges 
a full consideration of what reasonable means. If it is false, then 
society remains unprepared for, and consequently more vulnerable 
to, a shift that does, in fact, require unequivocally unreasonable 
conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Heroic action loses its moral force when it is required by law. 
Critical literature, however, has focused not on the consequences of 
this loss, but on two competing social forces, which have thus far 
shaped the question of whether the law should impose a duty to 
rescue another. The first—an autonomist perspective—finds its roots 
in classic historical cases that uphold a freedom from obligation to aid 
at the expense of a victim whose harm was easily preventable. The 
second and more recent utilitarian-based perspective upholds the 
benefits of rescue at the expense of individual autonomy in easy 
rescue scenarios, a movement that has evolved through the 
Restatement, case law, and Good Samaritan statutes. Much has been 
written about this trade-off and the kind of society that elects one 
over the other. But this exploration has focused primarily on the pros 
and cons of the choice with respect to those particular values—the 
value of liberty and the value of rescue, broadly speaking—without 
an examination of other kinds of social values inherent and affected 
by such a choice. Although heroes provide social meaning and legal 
clarity in a way that is important to both autonomists and utilitarians, 
their importance does not fit cleanly into either camp. 
An examination of the value of the rescuer as hero is a crucial 
missing piece in the ongoing duty-to-rescue dialogue. Heroes are 
treasured on a social level for reasons that are familiar—they inspire 
hope and incite other good-doing, and are cause for public 
celebration in many varied forms. In turn, heroes reflect upon the 
society in which they live. Heroes do good deeds and, in the duty-to-
rescue context, can even save lives. The significance of heroes on a 
legal level is perhaps less readily apparent but nonetheless just as 
crucial—they illuminate the meaning of reasonable conduct by 
demonstrating what reasonable is not: heroic. And they do this by 
existing on a plane that is separate from that of ordinary men. 
Expanding the duty to rescue in the hero context confuses the 
meaning of the word by merging—even if only a bit—those two 
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planes, consequently changing and ultimately damaging the social and 
legal values the concept provides. The recent enactment of state 
statutes creating affirmative duties to rescue—despite their narrow 
drafting—reflects further problems with an increased duty that does 
not parallel what society deems reasonable and attempts to demand 
“reasonable assistance” that society may call “heroic.” Such statutes 
tend to work from pessimistic assumptions about society’s general 
moral sensibilities that are probably false, and—if true—do not 
realistically reflect the capacity of moral legislation to change action. 
The debate over whether to require more rescue would benefit 
from further discussion about the various meanings of rescue to a 
society that celebrates those who perform them. In any case, 
expanding the duty, at the very least, blurs a line between reasonable 
and heroic conduct that is valuable when steadily drawn. And instead 
of creating more heroes—as proponents of an expanding duty might 
expect—requiring action further along the moral continuum only 
muddles the continuum itself, leaving society with heroes that mean 
less and laws that are unlikely to create more. 
